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AbstrAct: In his open letter to Hermann Cohen Zeit ists… (It Is Time) Franz 
Rosenzweig develops the idea of founding an Academy for the Science of Judaism 
as part of his new conception of Jewish learning. In his essay Bildung und kein 
Ende (“Of Bildung There Is No End”), he emphasizes that his goal is not to 
replace the study of Judaism in a university setting, but to establish collaboration 
between different traditions of learning as equals. The conjunction und (“and”) 
he uses in the title can be read as expressing the envisioned relationship between 
traditional Jewish and academic teaching, but also point to the difference between 
the two. Rosenzweig’s criticism addresses the subordination of Jewish traditions 
and Jewish learning to the norms of Western humanism.
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1. Introduction
In his open letter to Hermann Cohen It Is Time (Zeit ists…, 1917)1 written dur-
ing his military service in World War One, Franz Rosenzweig developed the idea of 
founding an Academy for the Science of Judaism (Akademie für die Wissenschaft 
des Judentums) as part of his new conception of Jewish learning. This institution 
was to serve not only academic research, but Jewish life in general by rendering the 
‘Jewish world’ comprehensible to the young generation.
Rosenzweig’s approach can be interpreted as an early sign of the Jewish renais-
sance to come in the early years of the 20th century and particularly as a response 
to the disunity among Jews during World War One. He argues that equal status 
accorded to the Jews as a community would necessarily lead to equal standing in 
the academic study of Judaism.
In his essay, however, Rosenzweig emphasizes that his goal is not to substitute 
or replace the study of Judaism in a university setting, but to establish equal col-
laboration between different traditions of learning. The conjunction and here can 
1 F. Rosenzweig, It Is Time: Concerning the Study of Judaism (1917), Engl. transl. by W. Wolf, 
in idem, On Jewish Learning, ed. by N. N. Glatzer, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 
2002, pp. 27-54.
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be read as an expression of the envisioned relationship between traditional Jewish 
teaching and the academic mode of the university, but also, I am certain, point to 
the difference between the two. Rosenzweig’s criticism addresses the subordina-
tion of Jewish tradition and Jewish learning to the norms of Western humanism.
Does his suggestion to re(dis)cover the tradition of Jewish learning and teaching, 
a school of religious thought dating back to antiquity, merely predictably reflect 
the Zeitgeist, the spirit of his times? Why would it be worthwhile rehabilitating the 
notion of Jewish tradition in modern discourses of educational philosophy? This 
presentation will begin to address these questions by applying the lens of Jewish 
tradition to an analysis of dialogical concepts of learning. My understanding of 
these notions will be based on Rosenzweig’s two essays It Is Time and “Of Bildung 
There Is No End” (Bildung und kein Ende, 1920)2, on the comments of the first text 
made by Nahum Norbert Glatzer, and on some ideas developed by Emmanuel 
Levinas, Maimonides, and Nechama Leibowitz.
In his introduction to the collection of Rosenzweig’s essays On Jewish Learn-
ing, Glatzer claims that the new Academy for the Science of Judaism projected 
by Cohen did not take the form which Rosenzweig intended. This is despite the 
fact that the Academy’s outlook differed greatly from that of the academic study 
of Judaism established about century earlier. “At this moment, one hundred years 
after the founder of the ‘Science of Judaism’ [Wissenschaft des Judentums] entered 
the university, this kind of Jewish literary research is being menaced by non-Jewish 
competition, which in any event had never respected it as an equal in the field 
of biblical research”3. Rosenzweig therefore argued in favor of employing faculty 
with specifically theological training at such an academy.
After the Shoah, the French-Jewish philosopher Levinas also raised concerns 
over the academic approach of submitting Jewish tradition to the norms of human-
ism, to hermeneutic methods which disqualify rabbinic exegesis, and to an abstract 
universalism. He saw this method at the heart of the very present crisis of Jewish 
education in emancipated Jewish society4.
Based on passages from his open letter It Is Time, the present essay looks at 
Rosenzweig’s impulses for Jewish learning and scholarship with regard to his un-
derstanding of “spiritually Jewish organizations”5 (jüdischgeistige Organisationen) 
and “new thinking” (neues Denken)6 in Jewish religion.
2 F. Rosenzweig, “Of Bildung There Is No End” (Eccl. 12.12). Wishes concerning the Bildungs-
problem of the moment, especially concerning the question of adult education (1920), Engl. transl. 
by M. Zank, in Textual Reasonings. Jewish Philosophy and Text Study at the End of the Twentieth 
Century, ed. by P. Ochs and N. Levene, London, SCM Press, 2002, pp. 229-239.
3 F. Rosenzweig, It Is Time, cit., p. 45.
4 Cf. E. Levinas, Antihumanism and Education (1973), in idem, Difficult Freedom. Essays on 
Judaism (19762), Engl. transl. by S. Hand, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, 
pp. 277-288, here p. 279.
5 F. Rosenzweig, It Is Time, cit., p. 54.
6 Cf. F. Rosenzweig, The New Thinking. A Few Supplementary Remarks to the Star (1925), 
Engl. transl. by A. Udoff and B. E. Galli, in Franz Rosenzweig’s “The New Thinking”, ed. by A. 
Udoff and B. E. Galli, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1999, pp. 67-102.
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He identified the problem of the Academy in its lack of interest in rejuvenating 
Jewish life as opposed to investigating the dead facts of its past.
As Glatzer points out, “there was no way of tracing the impact of scholarship 
upon the reading or listening audience, no way of communicating the scholar’s 
insight to the learning youth”7.
Rosenzweig turned his back on the Academy as soon as its sponsors had de-
cided to divorce research from the teaching activity of the scholars, a combination 
he had advocated in It Is Time.
2. Academic and Jewish teaching
In 1920, Rosenzweig developed techniques designed as an alternative to uni-
versity learning or academic Jewish studies (Wissenschaft) in his Jewish teaching 
house (Jüdisches Lehrhaus). This is an early indicator of the perceived relevance 
of Jewish traditions of learning and its significance for grounding this implicit 
contrast between academic culture and lived (informal) learning experiences. To 
ensure this method was applied, the faculty were expected to have little expert 
knowledge about the topic they taught, much like any dilettante of the Jewish 
tradition. Some on the staff even were Christians. Moreover, in clear opposition 
to the teacher-centered learning that was still prevalent in academic settings at 
the time, the learning process he aimed for was closer to a scheme of “learn-
ing students” being instructed by “learning teachers” in pedagogical reciprocity. 
Rosenzweig writes:
This is not to say that we find fault with our Jewish primary school teacher […]. 
Nevertheless, for reasons which do not wholly relate to education per se but still 
more to the interests of the Jewish community, it must be stated and it will be proven 
that the instruction we have in mind should, as far as feasible, be given by university 
graduates. It will not even be satisfactory to have high school teachers of mathematics 
or modern languages give this kind of instruction as an avocation8.
Not only the rabbinate, but also education needs theologians who have under-
gone academic training.
3. Bildung und kein Ende
The title of Rosenzweig’s essay “Of Bildung There Is No End” is also significant 
in this context. As the translator Michael Zank explains in his commentary on 
the English translation, Rosenzweig chose the words Bildung und kein Ende 
7 N. N. Glatzer, Introduction, in F. Rosenzweig, On Jewish Learning, cit., pp. 9-24, here p. 15.
8 F. Rosenzweig, It Is Time, cit., p. 43.
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precisely to evoke a resonance with Eccl. 12:12 (“to the making of many books 
there is no end”)9.
Rosenzweig made a plea for respecting the openness that each “moment/in-
stant” (Augenblick) of learning entails and for the centrality of the living (spoken) 
word in Jewish education. He tried to escape a “scientific” approach and above 
all the academic practice of “making books” (Büchermachen) because the writ-
ten word represents a closed mental process and is therefore merely an object of 
consideration. According to Rosenzweig, such a mental process is not oriented 
towards posing questions, but only towards finding answers.
Rosenzweig used this perspective to criticize the world of books that viewed educa-
tion as a well-planned totality which those who are eager for knowledge approach in 
order to obtain a step-by-step analysis. He compares this “whole” (Ganzes) to the uni-
versity. According to him, such a whole is similar in structure to the university which 
is complete in its entirety, yet at the same time an academic edifice that is always in the 
process of becoming in all its detail10. However, a university that ignores its proces-
sual character and presents itself to the students as complete and accomplished will 
ultimately claim to represent something that it is not, or at least not entirely.
Human beings do not educate themselves to become a social construct, a social 
function, but above all to become a living being, to become what they truly are or 
can be, and this is where Rosenzweig believes that ‘churning out’ books reaches its 
limit. Life, the present, is read between the lines – it is that crucial living moment 
between the past and the future. This instant of living in itself puts an end to the 
activity of churning out books11.
But how could such a “moment of life” in human learning be thematized or be 
rendered into theory at all? According to Rosenzweig, the moment of life in human 
learning can be theorized through the concept of confidence:
Confidence is the word of readiness, the readiness which does not ask for formulas, 
which has no “What should I do now?” and no “How do I do it?” between its teeth. 
Confidence does not fear the day after tomorrow. It lives in the today, it steps without 
care over the threshold leading from today to tomorrow12.
The messengers of this sense of confidence are learners whose wishes are deployed 
into the space that is opened up in the search for something undefined and unplanned. 
Rosenzweig claims in his writings that the teacher who can meet such wishes must 
cease to be a teacher as defined by any dogma or method; he must be both much more 
and much less: he must be a master at the same time as being a student.
Therefore, from Rosenzweig’s viewpoint “it is not at all sufficient” for the teacher 
“to ‘know’ himself, nor that ‘he can teach’”. The teacher “must have an entirely 
9 M. Zank, Franz Rosenzweig, the 1920s and the <email> moment of textual reasoning, in 
Textual Reasonings, cit., pp. 229-250, here p. 247, note 4.
10 Cf. F. Rosenzweig, “Of Bildung There Is No End”, cit., esp. p. 237.
11 Cf. ibidem, pp. 231 f.
12 Ibidem, p. 236.
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different ‘skill’: he must himself be able – to wish”. It is of utmost importance that 
the teacher be someone who “can wish”. The teachers will also be discovered “[i]
n the very speaking space and at the same speaking time” where the students find 
themselves. “And perhaps the same person will be discovered at the same speak-
ing time as a master and a student. Indeed, whether he is suitable as a teacher is 
entirely certain only once this occurs”13. In this way, both teaching and learning are 
equally formative processes open to the unexpected.
4. Scholarship and dialogical teaching
Through these ideas and within such a context, Rosenzweig’s plea for the aboli-
tion of the academic lecture in favor of conversation and discussion makes much 
more sense:
The consultation [Sprechstunde; literally: “speaking hour”] turns into a conversation. 
Those who find each other here and want to continue their conversation in private 
may arrange for an appointment. The consultation [Sprechstunde] brings together 
everyone with everyone. For it unites everyone with everyone with respect to 
that which everyone has in common with everyone: the consciousness, however 
germinating, however hidden, of being a Jewish human being. That, following this, 
he can come together with others, that he can – wish together with others, this will 
become his encounter [Erlebnis], even if his wish should remain unfulfilled. For this 
is to be expected. For just as it can happen in the case of the opposite, “Berlin”, 
system that its lectures may be cancelled because of a lack in participation, so it needs 
to be possible to happen here, too, that wishes must remain ungratified because of the 
absence of a teacher. This does not hurt14.
While it unites the many, the multitude, a wish that they share, even if it remains 
unfulfilled, is as alive as a lecture might be dead while it remains merely mentioned 
in a course listing (without ever taking place). “And this, really this alone, is what 
matters: liveliness [die Lebendigkeit]”15. Rosenzweig’s dialogical idea has not lost 
any relevance in the context of teaching. For example, a similar desire for liveliness 
was also expressed by the contemporary philosopher and teacher Gabriel H. 
Cohn in his introduction to Leibowitz’s book Studien zu den wöchentlichen 
Tora-Vorlesungen, interpreting Leibowitz’s dialogical pedagogical method: “The 
student’s personal engagement with the Scriptures and their interpreters made 
the study of the Torah an extraordinary intellectual challenge, and each individual 
student saw his own personal Torah in the Scripture”16.
13 Ibidem, p. 237.
14 Ibidem, p. 238.
15 Ibidem.
16 G. H. Cohn, Wie lieb’ ich deine Lehre, in N. Leibowitz, Studien zu den wöchentlichen 
Tora-Vorlesungen (1996-1998), Germ. transl. by A. Bodenheimer, ed. by G. H. Cohn, Jerusalem, 
Eliner Library, 2006, pp. 11-20, here p. 13.
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Hanoch Ben-Pazi also interprets Jewish dialogical teaching in his essay Ethic, 
Responsibility Dialogue. The Meaning of Dialogue in Lévinas’s Philosophy. In it, 
he claims that Levinas calls on the teacher to respect the student’s existence as 
an Other by taking on the responsibility embodied in the words “Here I am” in 
the sense of a willingness to assume responsibility and responsiveness towards the 
Other. According to Ben-Pazi, Levinas does not refer to a deep relationship forged 
between the teacher and the student, but rather to a responsibility the teacher 
takes upon himself. “The ethical-educational dialogue is not a product of the quest 
for dialogue but rather of the depth of responsibility toward alterity assumed by 
the individual”17.
5. Scholarship and individual learning
Consequently, instruction and teaching can constrain the living moment or the 
living teacher, and it can adopt the principles that underpin it from the past. Yet 
according to Rosenzweig, it is the flame of the day that distinguishes teaching as a 
lived experience from doing so as a dead academic exercise. In the light of today, 
of each current instance or moment, any curriculum necessarily goes wrong right 
from the start, from the moment it is set up as a fixed schedule and is given primacy 
in shaping the learning experience. We cannot make strict plans or predictions for 
something that is alive without destroying its liveliness and unexpectedness, and 
this is what concerns Rosenzweig most.
About thirty years later (after the Second World War), another Jewish 
philosopher, Abraham Joshua Heschel, appears to agree with Rosenzweig’s idea 
of liveliness in his work on The Prophets, an expanded English translation of his 
German doctoral thesis:
In the academic environment in which I spent my student years philosophy had 
become an isolated, self-subsisting, self-indulgent entity, a Ding an sich, encouraging 
suspicion instead of love of wisdom. The answers offered were unrelated to the 
problems […]. I was slowly led to the realization that some of the terms, motivations, 
and concerns which dominate our thinking may prove destructive of the roots of 
human responsibility and treasonable to the ultimate ground of human solidarity18.
Against these predictive obsessions (or against what we might, in contemporary 
terms, call an obsession with the securitization and prudentialization of education)19, 
Rosenzweig instead centers the “readiness” or preparedness for the unexpected, for 
17 H. Ben-Pazi, Ethics Responsibility Dialogue. The Meaning of Dialogue in Lévinas’s 
Philosophy, in “Journal of Philosophy of Education”, L (2016), n. 4, pp. 619-639, here p. 624.
18 A. J. Heschel, The Prophets, New York, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1962, 
p. XVIII.
19 For a critique of those phenomena, see, for instance, M. Papastephanou, Education, risk 
and ethics, in “Ethics and Education”, I (2006), n. 1, pp. 47-63, and M. Kaminska, Dilettantism 
and the education of the expert, in Philosophy as Lived Experience. Navigating through dichotomies 
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things which are alive and invite fresh responses. Above all, being ready for the unex-
pected means refraining from on plans and planning. Such restraint is characterized 
as a ‘jerk of intention’ and as an instant of ‘inspection and introspection’, free of pre-
formulated intentions and ideas. Rosenzweig asks who can forecast with a plan what 
the individual will contemplate. According to Rosenzweig, this process of ‘freeing 
oneself’ represents an empty form of readiness that may fill itself and only itself. Only 
the empty forms that allow the moment to happen can be contained by something. 
“Something […], merely – ‘space and time’”, is the new beginning: “a speaking 
space [Sprechraum], a speaking time [Sprechzeit]. This is the only thing that lets itself 
be ‘organized’ in advance”; “[r]eally nothing but this”20 – Rosenzweig writes.
I believe we can find a description of a similarly demanding open learning pro-
cess in Maimonides’ work The Guide of the Perplexed, part I, chap. 33. However, 
Maimonides writes about the openness of study and the personal discipline of 
students in the context of Jewish teaching:
When […] a man grows perfect and the mysteries of the Torah are communicated to 
him either by somebody else or because he himself discovers them – inasmuch as 
some of them draw his attention to others –, he attains a rank at which he pronounces 
the above-mentioned correct opinions to be true; and in order to arrive at this conclu-
sion, he uses the veritable methods, namely, demonstration in cases where demonstra-
tion is possible or strong arguments where this is possible. In this way he represents 
to himself these matters, which had appeared to him as imaginings and parables, in 
their truth and understands their essence21.
I see this thought reflected in Rosenzweig’s criticisms of the philosophical and 
educational system in his major work The Star of Redemption22 as well as in his 
educational writings. Those criticisms address the interference of systems (for 
instance, the educational system) in the human existential experience from the 
beginning of life and from the beginning of the learning process. The unity of the 
educational system was the nodal point of Rosenzweig’s criticism.
6. Conclusion
This text began as a presentation, and it has now become an essay aiming to 
introduce the audience (and its readers) to Rosenzweig’s conception of learning 
as part of the lived existential human experience. At this point, I do not intend to 
deeply analyze this idea, but rather to simply summarize it and emphasize that the 
of thought and action, ed. by M. Papastephanou, T. Strand and A. Pirie, Wien-Zürich-Berlin-
Münster, LIT Verlag, 2014, pp. 123-133.
20 Cf. F. Rosenzweig, “Of Bildung There Is No End”, cit., esp. p. 236.
21 M. Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, 2 vols., Engl. transl. by S. Pines, introductory 
essay by L. Strauss, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, 1963, pp. 71 f.
22 F. Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption (1921), Engl. transl. by W. W. Hallo, New York-
Chicago-San Francisco, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.
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main thesis on which Rosenzweig’s notion of learning can be based and further 
developed through an educational prism reflects a philosophy of lived experience 
beyond systematic narrowing. This thesis supports a certain hermeneutic attitude 
on the part of the interpreter or the teacher that enables an ethical experience free 
of interference from any fixed system, at least interference to the extent that the 
teacher comes to transport a sense (or reality) of dominance and manipulation.
